Shannon Defence
For Limerick, the weeks after the Boyne transformed the city into the principal military centre of the Jacobite war. Tyrconnell, Lauzun, Berwick and the retreating Irish regiments converged there, bringing roughly four thousand cavalry and sixteen thousand infantry. Only half the foot soldiers possessed muskets, yet Limerick now held the remaining stores, river crossings and western communications upon which the survival of the cause depended.
Lauzun immediately declared the city impossible to defend, mockingly claiming that William could capture it with roasted apples. Patrick Sarsfield, the Duke of Berwick and Governor Boisseleau rejected that judgement. They understood that Limerick guarded the lower Shannon, contained important provisions and military supplies, and remained one of the few ports still connected with France. Its loss would expose the western counties and probably end organised resistance.
The situation was nevertheless desperate. The walls were neglected, ammunition was scarce and only nine small guns were available. The treasury was nearly empty, trade with France had declined and the soldiers demanded overdue pay. Lauzun withdrew the French troops, military chest and artillery to the Clare side of the river, leaving the Irish commanders to organise the defence. They retained eight thousand infantry and the cavalry around Limerick, while other regiments guarded the Shannon or dispersed temporarily into the countryside.
William entered Dublin after several days of uncertainty. His government offered protection to labourers and artisans who surrendered, while excluding much of the Catholic landed class. Confiscation commissions began seizing estates, and reports of plunder and violence encouraged continued resistance. Rather than separating ordinary soldiers from their leaders, William’s measures strengthened the belief that surrender would bring neither security nor justice.
William then divided his forces. His main army would advance through the south before turning towards Limerick, while General Douglas marched west to seize Athlone and join him. Athlone was defended by Colonel Richard Grace with approximately eight hundred men. Grace burned the eastern portion, destroyed the bridge and concentrated his troops in the fortified western town.
When Douglas demanded surrender, Grace refused and prepared to resist. Williamite artillery bombarded the castle, but the defenders repeatedly damaged the enemy batteries. Attempts to cross the Shannon at Lanesborough and below Athlone were also repulsed. Rapparees attacked foraging parties, making Douglas’s supply position increasingly difficult.
After seven days, rumours that Sarsfield was approaching from Limerick persuaded Douglas to abandon the siege. He retreated through difficult countryside, losing men to ambushes, exhaustion and continuing attacks before joining William near Caherconlish.
William’s own march had brought Kilkenny, Waterford, Duncannon and Clonmel under his control. By reaching Caherconlish, only a short distance from Limerick, he brought the main Williamite army directly before the city’s approaches. The failed attack on Athlone showed that the Shannon could still be defended. Limerick would now have to prove whether its weakened walls and determined garrison could stop William himself. The coming siege would test not merely the masonry of its fortifications, but the courage, discipline and unity of everyone assembled behind them for Ireland’s survival.
Primary Sources
These records support the article’s account of the Jacobite concentration at Limerick, the weakness of its defences, Douglas’s failed attack upon Athlone and William’s advance towards the Shannon. The supplied narrative describes Lauzun declaring Limerick indefensible while Sarsfield, Berwick and Boisseleau resolved to hold it.
- John Stevens, Journal of the War in Ireland, 1689–1691.
Stevens served in the Jacobite army and was present in Limerick. His eyewitness journal describes the arrival and review of regiments, shortages of weapons and provisions, the French withdrawal and the condition of the city before William’s siege. It is one of the strongest primary sources for the Jacobite military experience in Limerick. (CELT) - Samuel Mullenaux, A Journal of the Three Months Royal Campaign of His Majesty in Ireland, Together with a True and Perfect Diary of the Siege of Lymerick — 1690.
Published during the war, this Williamite journal records William’s campaign from Dublin towards Limerick and the siege that followed. The original publication included a contemporary engraved map of the city. (Folger Catalog) - Gédéon Bonnivert, The Diary of Bonnivert — 1690.
Bonnivert accompanied William’s army and recorded its operations in Ireland. His diary confirms that General Douglas failed to capture Athlone and later describes Sarsfield’s successful destruction of William’s siege artillery outside Limerick. It provides valuable testimony from within the Williamite forces. (CELT) - George Story, A True and Impartial History of the Most Material Occurrences in the Kingdom of Ireland — 1691, and its continuation — 1693.
Story served as a Williamite army chaplain and recorded the campaigns as a participant. His works cover the movements through Ireland, the Shannon defences, military operations around Limerick and the later conclusion of the war. Despite the title, his account strongly favours the Williamite cause. (Quod Libet) - Charles O’Kelly, Macariae Excidium, or The Destruction of Cyprus.
O’Kelly was a Jacobite officer who fought for James II and wrote an allegorical history of the conflict from the Irish Jacobite perspective. His narrative records how James’s remaining supporters moved towards Limerick after the Boyne and determined to continue the war there. (CELT)
Stevens and O’Kelly provide the principal Jacobite accounts. Mullenaux, Bonnivert and Story record events from the Williamite side, allowing the opposing descriptions to be compared.
